情海惊魂

翻相关文章的时候读到这段，完全解释了情海惊魂被忽视的微妙情感关系，以下为节选段落及原文： 奥弗尔斯作品的这一特征值得特别关注。人们常会误以为他的电影遵循着某种熟悉的戏剧模式——即女性角色遭受男性角色（通常是其丈夫）的压迫、虐待或操控。乔治·库克的《煤气灯下》（1944）正是典型范例，而奥菲尔斯热衷展现权威男性在家庭关系中造成的伤害，或许能佐证此种解读。然而存在一个关键且具有启示性的差异：在奥菲尔斯的影片中，鲜少出现个体明确怀有恶意或独自承担伤害他人的责任。尽管其影片中的男性角色常以特定性别化的方式伤害他人，但他们往往自身也深陷不幸结局的罗网之中——被迫去执行那些他们既不渴望、也并非出于意愿的行为。他们只是更大结构的一部分，而正是这种结构在最初就制造了问题。 这种区别揭示了自主性的本质特征及其在奥菲尔斯电影中的缺失。若说情感剧往往通过处理某类伦理问题——如个体间的控制关系、意志薄弱等——来展开叙事，那么他的电影则呈现出截然不同的图景。对个体及其自主性的威胁，其根源在于超越个体的社会、文化与政治力量。角色们被困于一套明文规定的规则与实践之中，这些规则与实践本身就充满危险，它们明确限定了角色可能的行为模式、思考方式或行动路径。在奥弗尔斯的电影里，个体——尤其是女性——屡屡渴望挣脱禁锢自身的结构，却始终未能如愿。这种失败的根源在于凌驾于人物之上的社会秩序，但同时也与人物对社会规范的内化方式有关。奥菲尔斯展现的失败涉及这样一个世界：它未能赋予个体必要的资源，即他们能够吸收并运用新的事实与价值观，从而成功应对所面临的挑战。这些资源包括情感、思辨、创造力……一部开放式的实践能力清单，影片在叙事各处展现它们——或更常见地，展现它们的缺席。 我所描述的奥弗尔斯电影这两大特征相互交织，那些呈现“双重调谐结构”（dual attunement structure）的镜头运动，具有伦理意义。换句话说，它们在影片所讨论的“自主性问题”中获得了伦理内容。这些镜头为影片呈现的世界提供了道德视角，而角色们自身既无法企及这种视角，甚至最初都未能意识到其可能性。正是这些镜头运动——影片的核心"美学形式"——勾勒出伦理困境的轮廓——但影片中或许根本不存在这样善解人意的世界。 This feature of Ophuls’s work is important to keep in sight. There is a temptation to think of his films as following a familiar kind of melodrama, in which a female character is oppressed, mistreated, or manipulated by a male character (usually her husband). George Cukor’s Gaslight (1944) is a characteristic example of this, and Ophuls’s penchant for showing the harm done by male figures of authority in their domestic relationship might be evidence for such a reading. Yet there is a key and telling difference: in Ophuls’s films, it is rarely the case that individuals have an explicitly malignant presence or bear sole responsibility for the harm done to others. Even though male characters in his films cause harm to others and frequently do so in specifically gendered ways, they are often shown to be themselves caught up in a web of unhappy outcomes, doomed to actionsthey neither desire nor will; they are part of, and shaped by, a larger structure that creates the problems in the first place. This distinction reveals an important aspect of the nature of autonomy and its absence in Ophuls’s films. If melodrama tends to operate by working through one type of ethical problem—the control of one individual by another, akrasia, and so on— his films suggest something different. The threat to individuals, and to their autonomy, originates with sources that are supraindividual in nature: society, culture, politics. The characters are caught up in a set of rules and practices that explicitly prescribe their possible modes of behavior, deliberation, or action, and the rules and practices themselves are dangerous. In Ophuls’s films, individuals, especially women, repeatedly desire to break out of the structures that enclose them yet prove unable to do so. The reasons for this failure lie with the rigid social order above and beyond the characters, but they also have to do with the way characters have internalized its norms. The failures Ophuls shows involve a world that does not equip individuals with the resources that would allow them to incorporate and work with new facts and values, to successfully negotiate the challenges they face. These resources would be emotional, deliberative, creative . . . an open-ended list of practical capacities that the films show in action— or, more frequently, not in action—at various points in their narratives. These two general features of Ophuls’s films that I’ve been describing are bound up with one another; the camera movements that exhibit a dual attunement structure take on ethical significance—in a sense, they gain ethical content—in relation to the problem of autonomy in the films. They provide a moral perspective on the world the film shows, a perspective the characters are themselves unable to achieve, or even to recognize as a possibility in the first place. It’s these camera movements, the central “aesthetic form” of the films, that give a sense of the shape of the ethical demands raised by the characters, demands we would want a world to meet— but such a responsive world may not be possible within these films. 最后这句跟我之前的某段解析讲到一块去了，有点感动（在感动什么）